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Abstract
The national strategy for the protection of critical infrastructure and key assets is not
working due to a number of failed strategies, which this article examines in detail: federal-
ism (separation of state and federal governmental controls) advocates that the first line of
defense is local first responders; two years after the creation of the Department of Home-
land security, and the consequent requirement that states perform vulnerability and risk
analysis on their critical infrastructures, DHS has yet to define basic terminology needed
for states to perform meaningful analysis (“vulnerability” “risk”), or precisely state the
objectives of such analysis; private ownership of the majority of infrastructure assets has
been used as an excuse to do nothing – a major myth that is not only wasteful of effort, but
dangerous to the security of the nation; and finally, the notion that critical infrastructure
sectors are so large and complex that only the highest-consequence, lowest-probability
events can be prevented has led to further missteps in the road to critical infrastructure
protection policy. This article ends with recommendations for policy changes that address
these issues.
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INTRODUCTION
One can frame the policies of the current national strategy for critical infrastructure 
protection using a number of colorful analogs, but transportation seems the most fitting
because transportation is one of the sectors identified by the National Strategy for the 
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, published by the White 
House in 2003.1  Beneath the title of this article is the reality that we have a long way to 
go to protect critical infrastructure assets – across all sectors – at even modest levels of 
security. Indeed, if a 1,000-mile journey begins with a single step along a well-defined 
road, then the national strategy road is badly in need of repairs. 
This paper exposes only a handful of the many myths, fallacies, and roadblocks 
preventing the nation from protecting its second-most important assets: the water, power, 
energy, telecommunications, information, and transportation systems that make up 
critical infrastructure (CI).2 We claim that the first step in this 1,000-mile journey is to 
fix the potholes and eliminate the detours promoted by the current strategy for protection 
of the country’s CI. To do so, we must understand how the national strategy fails to 
address reality. We couch these realities in metaphorical terms – as potholes and detours 
on the road to protecting the nation’s critical infrastructures. The term “pothole” is used 
to identify problems and barriers to making progress, and the term “detour” is used to 
expose wrong-headed myths, distractions, and bumps in the road to better infrastructure 
security.
This paper argues against a purely federalist approach to critical infrastructure 
protection and instead advocates that the federal government take greater responsibility 
(and control) over state and local decisions; it argues that the first step in this 
transformation is to set standards, beginning with concise and clear definitions of 
vulnerability and risk. We then turn to the arguments preventing action – specifically that 
government is helpless to correct security problems in critical infrastructure because most 
infrastructures are owned and operated by the private sector. Finally, we make four 
concrete recommendations on how to improve critical infrastructure protection through 
re-thinking and re-aligning current policies.
Think Globally, Act Locally
The national strategy is based on the idea that the federal government should set goals 
and policies, while the states should assume primary responsibility for homeland security, 
because incidents happen at the local level. Specifically, the National Strategy defines the 
relationship between federal and state/local governments as follows:
In addition to securing federally owned and operated infrastructures and 
assets, the role of the federal lead departments and agencies is to assist 
state and local governments and private-sector partners in their efforts to:
• Organize and conduct protection and continuity of government and 
operations planning, and elevate awareness and understanding of 
threats and vulnerabilities to their critical facilities, systems, and 
functions;
• Identify and promote effective sector-specific protection practices and 
methodologies; and
1Lewis and Darken: Potholes and Detours
Homeland Security Affairs (http://www.hsaj.org), 2006
• Expand voluntary security-related information sharing among private 
entities within the sector, as well as between government and private 
entities.3
Basically, the federal government is primed to assist state and local governments, but the 
state/local governments are responsible for implementation of “protection practices, and 
methodologies.” This strategy has a number of deficiencies as pointed out by the first 
pothole.
Pothole 1: CIP (Critical Infrastructure Protection) is a local problem and therefore the 
federal government should provide guidance and funding, but state and local jurisdictions 
must become the first line of defense against attacks on critical infrastructure assets. 
This policy is not only dangerous – because local jurisdictions will never have the 
capability to protect their critical infrastructure assets – but an unfortunate waste of 
money. In fact, the Government Accounting Office recognized this problem soon after 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was formed: “The challenges posed in 
strengthening homeland security exceed the capacity and authority of any one level of 
government.”4
Consider the case of the Alaskan telecommunications sector. Alaska’s 
telecommunication infrastructure supports local police, fire, and emergency management 
functions as well as consumer telephone and Internet access. Without it, Alaskans would 
be isolated from the rest of the United States. Naturally, it makes sense for the Federal 
government – through the Department of Homeland Security – to provide funding and 
training to Alaskans so they can strengthen their telecommunications infrastructure and 
harden it against potential terrorist attacks. However, this strategy is inadequate and 
dangerous, because Alaska’s telephone and most Internet services are dependent on a 
single building in Seattle! The Weston building in Seattle is the sixth largest telecom 
hotel in the nation, and it provides connectivity to the citizens of Alaska. Alaskan’s 
cannot protect this major asset no mater how much money the Federal Government 
provides, because it lies outside of their jurisdiction. 
In addition to the problem of an asset in one state being critical to another state, there 
is the overarching problem of Interstate Commerce laws that regulate and shape 
infrastructures such as telecommunications, energy, power, and transportation. States 
have little power over the Federal regulators when it comes to passing laws that might 
affect an element of one of these infrastructures and weaken the same infrastructure at the 
national level. Examples of this can be found in cross-sector interdependencies. For 
example, the largest electrical power plant in Missouri (New Madrid) is totally dependent 
on the rail system that delivers coal from Wyoming. Rail transportation and electrical 
power sectors are regulated by federal agencies – not Wyoming and Missouri – and yet, a 
policy that may ensure reliable electric power generation in Missouri could conflict with 
energy policies affecting Wyoming. For example, should Interstate Commerce regulation 
of Wyoming rail shipments of coal be implemented to raise money to harden the rail 
transportation system across the USA, the rate payers in Missouri (and other states) 
would be negatively impacted. There is nothing that the state and local governments can 
do to offset federal regulation of infrastructure industries.
What should be done to circumvent this pothole? The current strategy is a detour 
headed in the wrong direction:
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Detour 1.1: Allocation of funding for CIP needs to be decided at the state and local level, 
not the national level. 
The problem with this detour is simply the fact that what is critical to a state may not be 
critical to the nation. Separate funding of State and local districts is a waste of money in 
most cases because the funding does not address the true need – typically because states 
and cities do not have the expertise to evaluate risk. Two years after receiving funding 
from the Department of Homeland Security, most local governments have not spent most 
of their allocation. It isn't that they can't spend the funds, but rather that there are many 
restrictions placed by the federal government on the spending of these funds and, most 
importantly, there is no coherent linkage of these restrictions to an infrastructure 
resiliency plan. Americans want to know how they are safer because of this funding. 
There is no answer, but there needs to be one.
Once again, we can use Alaska as an example. The largest nuclear power plant in the 
nation is located in Arizona, but most of the power consumed by Alaskans comes from a 
much smaller power plant in Beluga Bay, Alaska.5 If we use size as a measure of 
criticality, then it makes more sense to harden the Palo Verde Power Plant in Arizona 
than the much smaller Beluga Power Plant in Alaska. The problem with this strategy 
from a national CIP perspective is that the Beluga plant is more important than the Palo 
Verde plant, because it supplies 60% of all Alaskan power, while the Arizona nuclear 
power plant supplies less than 3% of the power consumed by the Western Power Grid. If 
the nuclear plant shut down, it would not be missed, because the Western Grid obtains 
power from many sources. This is not the case with the Beluga plant. If it fails, most 
Alaskans will be left without power. Therefore, the Beluga plant is much more critical –
to the Western Grid as well as to Alaska – than the much larger plant in Arizona. Size is 
not always the best measure of criticality. 
Detour 1.2: Allocation of funding resources should be based on population, size of state, 
and other political factors as determined by the Department of Homeland Security.
According to Citizens Against Government Waste, “Funding ratios guarantee each state 
.75 percent of the funds available for homeland security.  This formula initially 
distributes 40 percent of the funds among the states, with 60 percent for other 
allocations.  Under this model, for example, California, a target-rich state containing 12 
percent of the nation’s population, received only 7.95 percent of general grants.  On the 
other hand, Wyoming, which received .85 percent of the funds, holds only .17 percent of 
the population.  That means Congress provided $5.03 per capita for California and $37.94 
per capita for Wyoming.  Similarly, data from the Public Policy Institute of California 
revealed that Alaska received an astonishing $58 per resident and New York got less than 
$25.”6
Once again, allocation of funding based on arbitrary or political considerations will 
not solve the problem of enhancing security. Instead, it is wasteful and increases the 
probability of a successful terrorist attack. A national perspective is needed in this risk 
analysis process as demonstrated by both of these examples. This would reorient funding 
towards allocation on the basis of risk reduction – hopefully where it can reduce risk the 
most.
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These examples illustrate why the National Strategy’s pressure to push responsibility 
for the protection of critical infrastructures down to the local level is flawed. States and 
local governments are often not in control of the critical infrastructure assets they depend 
on. Further, local analysis of local assets results in wasted funding. Arizona is likely to be 
concerned for its Palo Verde Power Plant when, in fact, the Alaskan power plant at 
Beluga Bay is more important. But Arizona is unlikely to transfer funding from Arizona 
to Alaska! These are only the top-level challenges facing the nation – there are several 
other significant problems lurking at a deeper level.
A Failure to Communicate
One of the most difficult challenges facing the field of critical infrastructure protection is 
the lack of shared terminology. There are too many people using too many ill-defined 
terms for the community of homeland security experts to communicate, properly. The 
lack of widely accepted definitions of terms used in homeland security leads to 
reinvention of the wheel, false starts, and more detours.
Pothole 2: There are as many definitions of “vulnerability” and “risk” as there are 
agencies in federal, state, and local governments, combined! Before we can take the first 
step in a 1,000-mile journey, we need a compass. Currently, there is no universally 
accepted definition of the most basic measures of criticality – vulnerability and risk. 
For example, the intelligence community typically defines “risk” as R = T + V (Threat 
plus Vulnerability). The FBI says “risk” is R = I * T * V (probability of an incident times 
threat times vulnerability).7  A number of other methodologies use arbitrary metrics to 
gauge risk. The most popular method of gauging criticality of an asset such as a port, 
telecommunications center, water treatment plant, or transportation terminal is to assign 
numbers to each asset and then add them together. In ranked ordering systems such as the 
U.S. Coast Guard’s port security and risk assessment tool, risk is computed by summing 
assigned numbers to various properties such as damage, casualties, vulnerability, and 
threat. These numbers are provided by subject matter experts who, in turn, rely on their 
individual judgment when rating “vulnerability” and “risk.” The port asset with the 
highest total is declared the most critical. 
The validity of this approach relies on subject matter experts, which does not address 
the problem of inconsistency across experts. This leads to uneven ranking, because every 
expert has a different idea of how to assign numbers. It also leads to meaningless totals, 
because of the different interpretations of what the numbers mean.
The intelligence community’s risk equation is difficult to apply because it is not clear 
how one compares a low-threat, high-vulnerability asset with a high-threat, low-
vulnerability asset. If we add threat and vulnerability together and get the same total, 
what is the difference? Clearly, a high-threat condition deserves closer scrutiny than a 
low-threat condition, regardless of the vulnerability, and yet R = T + V produces 
indistinguishable totals. 
The FBI metric cannot deal with combination incidents such as the 9/11 attacks on 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. What does risk mean when the attackers target 
two or three assets at once? The U.S. Coast Guard metric has no equivalent in the real 
world, because the numbers are without units. For example, the USCG ranking does not 
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measure risk in dollars, casualties, or probability. Hence, it cannot be standardized, so 
how do we compare the results obtained by assessing two different ports?
We need a standard, scientifically exact method of assessing vulnerability and risk. 
Only then will we be able to define vulnerability and risk. A standard definition means 
that states and localities will be able to compare apples to oranges, and that the result of 
vulnerability analysis will mean something – across the 50 states. We can even go 
further: we can fund projects in a meaningful and productive manner.
Detour 2.1: Individual cities, states, and regions are in the best position to make their 
own definitions of “vulnerability” and “risk”, without the interference of the federal 
government.
This approach pretty much sums up the current state of affairs. While the DHS has 
provided general guidelines, each state is left to its own devices when it comes to 
defining what is critical, and how each defines “vulnerability” and “risk.” In 2003, the 
first year all states were required to perform a complete vulnerability analysis in order to 
receive federal funding for CIP, the results were meaningless, because every state used a 
different method, with a different outcome. If was impossible to compare the risk 
assigned to a bridge, say, in California, with a bridge in Wisconsin.
The definition and terminology problem can be easily solved by establishing simple, 
yet scientifically valid, definitions. Suppose for example, “vulnerability” is defined as the 
probability that an attack will succeed and “risk” is defined as the expected value of the 
damage caused by a successful attack. Vulnerability is a probability (a number from zero 
to 100%) and risk is a cost (a number that represents the impact of an attack on an asset 
or entire sector). Mathematically, risk is V * D, where V = vulnerability and D is
typically in units of dollars, casualties, or some other loss. 
These definitions are easily applied to all kinds of critical infrastructure assets and 
they have meaning in the real world; probability and dollars are real-world metrics. 
Vulnerability is equivalent to ‘likelihood’, and risk is equivalent to the real-world cost 
associated with an incident.8
Now we can standardize the results so that an assessment made by one expert is 
identical to an assessment made by another expert. We can compare apples to oranges, 
and then make progress towards hardening the most critical assets: the higher the risk, the 
higher the criticality of an asset.
Vulnerability is relative to the threat; e.g. the vulnerability of the Federal Reserve 
Bank in Manhattan might be 10% relative to a car bomb, and 60% relative to a cyber 
intrusion. This means there is a 10% likelihood that a car bomb will do enough damage to 
close the bank and a 60% chance that a cyber attack will halt banking business. 
Therefore, our definition incorporates the threat as well as the weakness of an asset to a 
specific threat. A bank may be vulnerable to a cyber attack, but not so vulnerable to a car 
bomb attack.
Vulnerability is not risk, and risk is not vulnerability. Instead, risk is the product of 
vulnerability times damage: R = V * D. Risk can be measured in casualties, loss of 
equipment, financial loss, etc. But you can’t mix metrics in one analysis. If you use 
dollars you can’t switch to casualties. The important distinction is that “vulnerability” is 
the probability of a successful attack, and “risk” is the expected value of damage due to 
the attack.
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Suppose the estimated damage of a successful car bomb attack on the bank is ten
million dollars and the cyber attack, one million.  Since risk equals vulnerability times 
damage, the risk associated with a car bombing is one million dollars (10% of $10 
million), and the risk associated with a cyber attack is $600 thousand (60% of $1 
million). In tabular form, we have the following:
Threat Vulnerability Damage Risk
Bomb 10% $10 million $1 million
Cyber 60% $1 million $600 thousand
Notice that the bank is more vulnerable to a cyber attack (60%), but the risk of a bombing 
is higher (one million dollars vs. $600,000)! Risk and vulnerability represent different 
measures of “criticality.” In this case, the cyber threat is “more critical” because the bank 
has greater vulnerability to a cyber attack, but the bomb is “more critical” because the 
bank has higher risk to a bombing. It is important to distinguish between vulnerability 
and risk, because they can produce different definitions of criticality depending on their 
relative size. Vulnerability is not the same as risk, which means we must decide which is 
more important – to minimize risk or vulnerability. 
What is the most likely incident in the foregoing example? Is it more likely that the 
bank will suffer a bomb attack or a cyber attack? How do we decide? In most risk 
assessment methods there is no way to model all possible incidents or events. In this 
example, the most likely event is a cyber attack (54%), and the least likely incident is a 
car bomb attack (4%). In addition, there is a 6% probability that both attacks will occur! 
In other words, the assessment must consider all possibilities. Most risk assessments 
ignore the likelihood of multiple, simultaneous attacks. The attacks of 9/11 were 
multiple, simultaneous attacks overlooked by the intelligence analysts, perhaps because 
their methodology ignored combination events. In our simple car bomb versus cyber 
attack example, there are actually three threats as summarized below.
Threat Vulnerability Damage Risk
Bomb 10% $10 million $1 million
Cyber 60% $1 million $600 thousand
      Both 6% $11 million $1.6 million
Vulnerability and risk assessments must incorporate combination events such that they 
can be compared across sectors, jurisdictions, and agencies. One way to do this is to 
standardize the multiple-event model. For example, a rigorous and standard method used 
in reliability engineering is fault tree analysis. Unlike current techniques in use by critical 
infrastructure protection analysts, fault tree analysis reveals all possible combinations of 
events, and assigns each a likelihood and risk value. Fault tree analysis can then 
determine the best allocation of funds to minimize vulnerability or risk. Fault tree 
modeling is beyond the scope of this article, but it is an established technique, so why not 
adopt it?
Without a scientific definition of vulnerability and risk, there is no way to perform 
meaningful risk assessments. There is no way to compare the risk of losing the Palo 
Verde nuclear power plant with losing the Beluga power plant, and there is no way to 
decide how much money to spend on prevention of a car bomb attack versus prevention 
of a cyber attack against banks and government buildings. Existing risk assessment 
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techniques cannot compare apples to oranges, and when they derive a figure of merit, the 
numbers are meaningless because they are based on opinion, not scientific measurement.
The “Do-Nothing Policy”
One of the myths circulating among policy-makers suggests that local government is 
helpless when it comes to CIP, because most critical infrastructure assets are owned and 
operated by private companies that make up the private sector. How can government 
protect assets they do not own? The problem with this myth is that it leads to a ‘do-
nothing” policy. This assumption that private-sector infrastructures are beyond the reach 
of government agencies is not only wrong, but also dangerous, because it leaves the most 
critical of assets unprotected.
Pothole 3: Private companies own and operate most critical infrastructure, hence 
government cannot intervene on behalf of public safety. These owners and operators 
must provide critical infrastructure protection – not the government. However, because 
prevention is costly, the owners are unlikely to spend the money needed to protect these 
assets on behalf of the public they serve.
For example, the Congressional Budget Office states, in an introductory comment to 
“Why the Private Sector Might Spend Too Little on Security,” 
Businesses would be inclined to spend less on security than might be 
appropriate for the nation as a whole if they faced losses from an attack 
that would be less than the overall losses for society. A number of 
common circumstances can exist in private industry in which there is a 
gap between the private and public costs of a terrorism event.”9
This is one of the most prevalent misconceptions in critical infrastructure protection 
literature. It ignores the burdensome regulation that controls these industries. Most 
power, telecommunication, and energy companies have little control over their business 
because of inter-state commerce law and a long history of government regulation. The 
government still “runs” these sectors through extensive regulation. In nearly every case, 
these industries fall under inter-state commerce laws or regulation by various 
governmental agencies designated by the U.S. Congress as overlords. In the electrical 
power sector, for example, Congress exercises its control through the FERC (Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission) and in the telecommunications sector, Congress 
exercises control through the FCC (Federal Communications Commission). In other 
words, most critical infrastructure is controlled by the federal government, which dictates 
how each sector operates.
Let us take the telecommunications sector as an illustrative example. The telecom 
industry was recently re-regulated by passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
This act reasserted detailed governmental control over this vast infrastructure. For 
example, telecommunications companies like AT&T, Verizon, and Nextel paid billions 
of dollars in license fees to the US Government for the right to “broadcast” cellular 
telephone signals through the air. Furthermore, state governments can set prices on 
telephone service, which leaves very little room for profit. The exercise of this federally 
and state-centered power suggests the opposite – that government does indeed exercise 
control over these sectors. In reality, government has the power to protect most critical 
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infrastructure sectors through existing regulatory agencies. For example, DOE 
(Department of Energy) sets standards of safety and security for all nuclear power plants; 
similar regulations control the safety and security of the nation’s energy pipelines through 
the Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline safety.
The current policy of the Department of Homeland Security appears to be “hands-off”
when it comes to dictating security standards in the telecommunications industry. This 
does not make sense when, in fact, the telecommunications industry is already heavily 
regulated by federal and state governments. Because the telecommunications business is 
an inter-state commerce business, there is virtually nothing preventing the addition of 
security standards to inter-state commerce policy. Indeed, the security standards of sister 
industries such as the electrical power industry, are dictated by federally run agencies 
such as the Department of Energy, FERC, and NERC (North America Energy Reliability 
Council). What prevents implementation of security measures in the telecommunications 
industry? It is certainly not the case that the telecommunications sector is owned and 
operated by the private sector. 
Detour 3.1: Critical Infrastructure Protection is too expensive to be provided by the 
companies that own and operate the CI, so we must increase taxes and provide financial 
incentives to the owners so they will harden their assets in the best interest of the country.
This myth is also widely believed by politicians and policy-makers, but once again, it 
defies logic and is dangerous because it distracts us from the task at hand – hardening the 
most critical assets in the various national infrastructure sectors. The first observation is 
this: most sectors bill consumers proportionally to services or products consumed. The 
electrical power companies bill by the kilowatt; the telecommunications industry bills by 
the minute; and the energy sector bills by the amount of energy consumed. In other 
words, these companies stop making money when services or consumables cease to flow. 
Continuity of operations already has its own built-in motive – the more reliable the 
operation, the more money received. Therefore, utility companies are motivated to 
increase continuity of operations. They do not need governmental incentives to reward 
them for doing what they do best: deliver services and consumables to the public.
The only thing more expensive than critical infrastructure protection is loss of 
continuity of operations. The notion that these industries will not protect the sources of 
their profit is a detour in the road to critical infrastructure protection. Instead of doing 
nothing, the national policy should be focused on solving the problem of continuity of 
operations and let the private sector pay for it, because they seek maximal profit. The 
profit motive works – it is maximized when the sector is operational 100% of the time.
And yet it cost something to harden critical infrastructure assets such as power plants, 
roads, and railways. Doesn’t this cost reduce corporate profits? We only need to look at 
the immediate past to show how the profit motive works in favor of private sector 
investment in security. Hurricane Katrina not only damaged much of the infrastructure of 
New Orleans, it also forced Entergy (the regional power company) to the brink of 
bankruptcy. Entergy lost revenues because its electrical power distribution lines and gas-
powered generators were flooded. The cost of stronger levees would have been much less 
than the loss of the company. But of course, Entergy has no control over levees – the 
Army Corps of Engineers does!
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The Big Bang Strategy
From the very outset, the strategy of the Department of Homeland Security has been to 
prepare the nation to respond to high-consequence (high damage), low-probability (low 
vulnerability) events.  One of the early critics of the federal government’s strategy 
identified three weaknesses:
1. Domestic preparedness is focused on highest consequence, least-likely attack, i.e., 
low-probability, high consequence WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) 
terrorism,
2. It is geared toward consequences of chemical/biological WMD attack, because 
WMD are becoming more accessible to terrorists, 
3.  It is geared toward federal investments at the state and local level due to 
Federalism and the belief that attacks will be local, not national; the US is too 
large to maintain a national operational capability at the local level; Federalism 
gives states extensive rights and responsibilities; and the division of labor across 
local, state, federal jurisdictions was compatible with the Stafford Act.10
The problem with this strategy is that state and local governments are woefully 
unprepared to meet such emergencies. Furthermore, they are unlikely ever to be capable 
of responding to big bangs such as a dirty bomb, pandemic, or mass transit emergency. 
The Hurricane Katrina disaster is the latest illustration of local governments being 
overwhelmed by a high-consequence, low-probability event.
Pothole 4: Critical Infrastructure assets are so vast and geographically dispersed that we 
can only protect against the highest-consequence, lowest-probability events.
Closer examination of this pothole shows how impractical it is. Consider the case of a 
smallpox attack launched in a major metropolitan area.11 Suppose the eight million 
inhabitants of Manhattan are exposed to smallpox via a scenario similar to the anthrax 
contamination perpetrated through the U.S. mail in 2002.12  Smallpox has a three day 
incubation period, which means vaccination is effective if given within three days of 
contraction of the virus. Vaccination is a non-trivial medical procedure that requires a 
trained person to carefully administer fifteen pinpricks to medically screened recipients. 
Working twenty-four hours per day, it is estimated that 4,000 health care workers would 
be needed to vaccinate one million people in a timely fashion. In other words, 32,000 
workers would be needed to vaccinate all eight million people living and working in 
Manhattan! 
Logistically, this is an impossible situation. The entire state of New York does not 
have 32,000 health care workers ready to vaccinate eight million people within three
days. Where might these 32,000 workers come from? The NYPD (New York Police 
Department) employees 34,000 workers, so why not turn this problem over to law 
enforcement? This leads to another detour.
Detour 4.1: Terrorism is a criminal activity and hence its prevention should be left to 
local law enforcement, fire fighters, and emergency management services. 
If terrorism is a criminal activity, then all our problems are solved! There are more than 
four million law enforcement, public safety, and medical emergency personnel in the 
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U.S., which makes the combined “EMS community” larger than the sum total of armed 
forces under the command of the Department of Defense. The problem is, they are 
dispersed throughout the country and lack the training, equipment, and intelligence 
information to leverage the entire community of four million “first preventers.” They 
would need to be coordinated at the national level in order to prepare them to respond to 
a high-consequence, low-probability event. If the strategy is to be prepared for the high-
consequence, low-probability event, then preparations must be national, not local. 
National readiness requires national organization and coordination. The lessons of 
Hurricane Katrina remind us that state and local preparedness is insufficient when major 
events occur.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Historically, most critical infrastructure failures have been caused by natural disasters, 
not terrorists, so why so much emphasis on the war on terrorism? Is terrorism, and critical 
infrastructure protection in particular, overrated? The answer must be ‘no’, because of 
9/11. Prior to 9/11 the U.S. considered the homeland safe; non-governmental 
organizations lacked the capacity to reach across the barriers provided by the Atlantic and 
Pacific oceans. The asymmetric attacks of 9/11 changed our thinking from elimination of 
the improbable to careful consideration of unlikely high-consequence events. Second, the 
9/11 attacks were – among other things – attacks on critical infrastructure. Manhattan, 
and the twin towers in particular, are the center of banking and finance for the entire 
country. 
If we are to seriously consider critical infrastructure protection as one of the pillars of 
homeland security, then several policy adjustments will be required. As a start, the 
Department of Homeland Security must:
1. Establish itself as a security standards setter and enforcer and act quickly to define 
basic terminology such as ‘vulnerability’ and ‘risk’. In addition, these definitions 
must be applied uniformly across the nation so that true risk assessment can become 
a practical means of evaluation and allocation of funds.
2. The national strategy must leverage national assets to the advantage of high-risk 
areas of the country rather than distribute responsibility to state and local 
governments. The U.S. already does this in a number of other areas: the FBI is 
essentially a national police force; the Department of Interior’s forest fire fighters 
are essentially national fire departments; and the National Guard is essentially an 
interior army. While all of these must remain under civilian control, there is little 
reason to hold back; use these national resources to protect national assets.
3. The interface between government and private sector companies has long been 
established by inter-state commerce laws, regulatory agencies, and the utilities that 
own and operate most critical infrastructure sectors. There is no reason to do 
nothing. Legislation needs to be enacted to guarantee “target hardening” of the 
nation’s most critical infrastructure assets. 
4. Terrorism is not only a criminal activity – it is a military assault on the entire 
population. Hence, we must disavow the notion that local law enforcement agencies 
are capable of preventing acts of violence against critical infrastructure assets. An 
attack on the Weston building telecom hotel located in Seattle is not a criminal 
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activity against Seattle, but a military action against the entire country. It must be 
dealt with as such. 
It is time to re-evaluate the national strategy and replace state and local strategies with a 
national effort. This has been done within the Department of Interior and Forest Service:
large forest fires are fought across regional boundaries, largely by a federal force. It has 
been done to some extent within the food and agriculture sector: FDA regulators work 
with the private sector to ensure the safety of the food supply. And whether or not we 
admit it, the FBI is a national police force that transcends state and local borders.
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